The United States has made significant progress in weakening Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz and restoring the flow of oil from Gulf countries. At the same time, Iran’s own oil exports have fallen sharply under an American blockade. Yet these gains have done little to bring the wider Iran war closer to an end. Months after the U.S. and Israel launched the conflict, fighting continues, diplomatic efforts have stalled, and rising oil prices are spreading the economic consequences well beyond the Middle East.

Oil Is Moving Through Hormuz Again

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most important waterways in the global economy. In peacetime, roughly one-fifth of the world’s traded oil and gas passes through the narrow waterway. Iran effectively closed the strait during the opening days of the war, creating a worldwide economic shock while continuing to export much of its own oil, primarily to China.

In recent weeks, however, that balance has shifted.

Figures compiled by Homayoun Falakshahi, an oil expert at global trade monitor Kpler, show Iranian oil exports falling from approximately 1.85 million barrels per day last spring to around 255,000 barrels per day in August.

At the same time, non-Iranian oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz have recovered dramatically. They fell to around 300,000 barrels per day at the height of the conflict but reached approximately 8.4 million barrels per day in September. When alternative export routes are included, the figure rises to about 10.8 million barrels per day.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright offered a similar assessment, saying the flow had recovered to “two-thirds or more of preconflict flows.” Before the war, non-Iranian exports stood at roughly 14 million barrels per day, according to Falakshahi.

Iran’s Economy Is Feeling the Pressure

For Tehran, the reversal has come at a high economic cost.

The U.S. blockade has severely restricted Iranian oil exports, while additional American sanctions are adding pressure to an already struggling economy. Prices inside Iran have risen, and longer lines have formed outside gas stations.

However, there is little evidence so far that economic pressure is producing the political outcome Washington wants.

Iran’s increasingly hard-line leadership has not made major concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, its disputed nuclear program, or its support for armed groups throughout the region. Nor has the economic decline triggered the kind of domestic uprising that might force Tehran to change course.

That creates a difficult problem for the United States. Washington may be succeeding at hurting Iran economically while still lacking a clear path for turning that pressure into an end to the war.

Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the International Crisis Group, described the central problem by saying Washington still “lacks a theory of victory.”

Military Gains Have Come With a Growing Cost

Restoring oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has also required a substantial American military presence.

Maintaining that deployment is putting pressure on U.S. military resources while adding to the financial and human cost of a conflict that began in February and was originally expected to last only a matter of weeks.

According to the AP report, the war has already cost U.S. taxpayers more than $37.5 billion and resulted in the deaths of 18 American service members. Those costs are becoming increasingly important politically as the United States approaches the November midterm elections.

Mona Yacoubian, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, warned that the improvement around Hormuz should not be mistaken for victory.

“Iran shows no sign of backing down,” Yacoubian said, while warning that the conflict could become prolonged without a clear winner.

Iran Has Other Ways to Raise the Stakes

Iran’s options extend far beyond the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian forces have continued attacking ships in the strait, prompting limited U.S. strikes against Iranian coastal areas. Tehran has responded with missile attacks against Arab countries hosting American forces. Meanwhile, the strain on the U.S. supply of sophisticated missile interceptors could create opportunities for Iran to intensify its attacks.

Iran can also apply pressure through regional allies.

The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen have stepped up attacks against Saudi Arabia, including strikes against Saudi oil facilities and shipping. The attacks threaten another strategically important trade corridor around the Bab el-Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea with routes leading toward the Suez Canal.

The Houthis have damaged Saudi Arabia’s Jizan refinery, an important supplier of diesel and jet fuel to Europe. Saudi oil shipments through the Bab el-Mandeb toward Asia fell from roughly 3.4 million barrels per day in June to just 128,000 in August. They recovered to around 700,000 barrels per day in September, but remained far below earlier levels.

The Oil Shock Is Spreading Beyond the Battlefield

The renewed pressure on shipping and energy infrastructure is being felt around the world.

Brent crude, the international oil benchmark, climbed above $100 per barrel this week. Diesel prices also reached record levels, increasing concerns that higher transportation and agricultural costs could feed broader inflation.

That presents a political challenge for President Donald Trump, who has acknowledged that gasoline prices are likely to remain elevated through the U.S. midterm congressional elections.

It also shows why control of the region’s shipping routes matters far beyond Iran, Israel, and their immediate neighbors. Disruptions around both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb can affect energy supplies, shipping costs, consumer prices, and economic conditions thousands of miles away.

Battlefield Progress Has Not Produced a Political End

The United States has changed the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. More non-Iranian oil is moving through the region, while Iran has lost much of the oil revenue it was able to maintain earlier in the war.

But the larger strategic problem remains unresolved.

A June agreement quickly collapsed, diplomatic progress has stalled, and low-level fighting continues. Iran’s leadership has shown little willingness to concede under economic pressure and may instead choose further escalation if it believes the costs of the blockade have become unacceptable.

The result is a conflict in which military and economic gains have yet to produce a clear political outcome. The Strait of Hormuz may be more open than it was at the height of the fighting, but the Iran war remains dangerous, expensive, and unpredictable. With Tehran still resisting U.S. pressure and regional attacks threatening other critical shipping routes, progress at sea has not yet created a path toward peace.